Hermeneutics Part One
Posted by Reformed Reader on September 7, 2007
I have the big white hardcover, Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation, on my desk in front of me. It is actually six books bound together in one, done by Zondervan in 1996. The six individual volumes found in this book include the works of Tremper Longman III, Moises Silva, V. Philips Long, Vern Poythress, and Richard Muller. I’ve read them all except Muller’s chapter on the study of theology, which looks like a fine read. I confess, Muller is one of those guys who have given me a deep love for Reformation history and orthodoxy.
I’ll start with a few notes on Poythress’ contribution entitled, Science and Hermeneutics. This was interesting for me particularly because Poythress reminded me how the scientific method crept into (or stormed into?) the church and the interpretation of Scripture in the 18th century and beyond. For example, the historical-critical method really built on Bacon’s six steps: gather data, formulate a hypothesis, derive predictions from it, check the predictions, and if it proves false, start over. Unfortunately, even Hodge was a bit influenced by this model (minus the criticism/naturalism, of course) (see FCI, 452).
Poythress then uses T. Kuhn (I confess, I never heard of him before this read) to interact with and chide Bacon’s method applied to Scripture. In a Van Tillian way, Kuhn reminded fellow scientists that “data are never ‘hard facts’” (FCI, 457). Or, as the great Dr. Van Til said, “There are no brute facts.” Here’s a question I’d love answered: Is there a single person/influence behind Van Til, Polanyi, and Kuhn, or did these three men come up with the same conclusions independently? Of course, similar things were said earlier in the history of philosophy/theology, but it does leave me curious.
Two more questions: First, what does the historical critical method look like today in colleges and seminaries? Is it a whole new animal or a big brother to the past? Second, I haven’t read much of Poythress beyond this. Any comments on Poythress’ work in this area in general? Is he worth reading more of in this area?
More on this book later…or sooner.
shane
Sunnyside, WA
Andrew Compton said
Not sure about the influences of Kuhn, CVT, and Polyani . . . I guess we tend to associate the recognition of one’s “situated-ness” with postmodernity, whereas here we see each of these figures doing just that, quite apart from the PM movement.
Your question about what the historical critical method looks like today in seminaries and schools (and hence churches) is a good one. It seems like the academy is divided between good old fashioned rationalism devoted to the scientific method, and full blown postmodern individualism. Even people who don’t like the overly confident epistemology of some of the rationalists, however, still can’t seem to take postmodernity to an absurd level of total equivocity.
It seems like the higher critical method is seen simply as scholars are still using their own reason magisterially – unwilling to be molded by the world of the text and its claims being made upon them. They accept theses that undermine the integrity of the books of the Bible and in fact seem to hold worldviews that simply can’t provide the preconditions for intelligibility. (Go CVT!!!) We probably see this most simply in the denial of the historicity of the Biblical narrative (i.e., geschicte is not historie in their mind).
Well, I’m done rambling for a bit.
I haven’t read much Poythress, but I know he’s solid. I once heard an interview with him on St. Anne’s Pub. I’m interested in one day reading his book on redeeming science . . . sounds interesting!
Shane said
Right on.
I’d love to see some examples of this historical critical method and the postmodern individual method clashing. In the “fallout” from the huge explosion, we might find some helpful nuggets. Does Brueggemann fit in there? I mean, does he sing two songs, accepting some tendencies of each?
Andrew Compton said
I feel like Brueggemann sort of straddles the fence on these things, but I could possibly stand to be corrected on this. Probably part of this is me reading Brueggemann as the confessionally Reformed guy that I am.
I find it so peculiar that he can critique modernity and the higher-critical enterprise for its over dependence on Descartes and the like, but then still hold to interesting forms of empiricism that cause him to doubt miracles and historicity and such. (At least I believe he doubts the historicity of the miracles even though he is clear that we can’t dismiss the literary reality of them; to do so is to get rid of an important part of Israel’s core testimony.)
It seems like a consistent reaction to the higher criticism is into the analogical, covenantal epistemology of Reformed theology. I guess all of this is presupposing VanTil though. Since I have views about knowledge and proof and such that are greatly indebted to CVT, I can’t fathom how leaving pure univocity for pure equivocity is very appealing – not when analogy is so much more satisfying, not to mention intellectually compelling!